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Challenging the State by Reproducing its Principles
The Demand for “Gorkhaland” between Regional Autonomy and 
the National Belonging
Contrary to assumptions about the dualist relationship between region and 
nation, I propose to understand both as simultaneously emerging. An analysis 
of the rhetoric of the “Gorkhaland” movement that demands a separate union 
state in India to be carved out of West Bengal demonstrates that although 
the movement challenges the distribution of power over territory, it does so 
by using a “pan-Indian grammar,” to borrow Baruah’s terminology. This is 
reflected in imaginative geographies that endow the demanded territory with 
meaning and render it an ethno-scape, while at the same time presenting it as 
a viable part of an imagined Indian nation. The Gorkhas attempt to bridge 
the gap between the “national” and the “regional” and challenge dominant 
identity ascriptions. In doing so, they stress their multiple belongings and 
a!liations. In this process the Indian nation is produced at various levels of 
society. 
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It is a warm evening in May 2012. I am having dinner together with my host family which lives on one of the large tea plantations in Darjeeling in the foot-
hills of the Indian Himalaya. Every so often we discuss politics and the demand for 
a separate union state of “Gorkhaland” that the Nepali-speaking population of the 
three hill subdivisions of Darjeeling district has raised toward the West Bengal state 
and the Indian central government. “As soon as we leave Darjeeling people treat us 
like foreigners. They do not know where Darjeeling is and that it is a part of India. 
Instead we are stigmatized as people coming from Nepal. But we have been living 
here for generations—we are not Nepali citizens!” explains my host father. “We 
could be evicted at any time. There is no security for us here,” adds his wife. “Only 
a separate state will give us security. If people ask where we are from, we can say we 
are from ‘Gorkhaland.’ Then everybody will know that we are Indians.” I question 
them and ask how they could ever be forced out of Darjeeling as they possess Indian 
voters’ identity and ration cards—but they stress that only a separate state would 
guarantee them an Indian identity. We discuss these issues many times, and the lon-
ger I stay in Darjeeling the more often I am told the same thing by di5erent persons 
of di5erent backgrounds: “Only a separate state will give us an Indian identity.” 
But what makes people believe that a separate state could provide them an Indian 
identity when they are already living within India, on Indian territory, possessing 
o!cial identification documents? What general beliefs, values, and assumptions are 
reflected in such thinking? These questions also relate to broader concerns about 
the general relationship between demands for new states such as Gorkhaland and 
the Indian central state, or, in other words, between regionalism and the ideal of a 
pan-Indian identity and nationalism in India. These are the relationships that this 
article seeks to explore. 
Demands for new states and indian nationalism
Demands for new states are not a recent phenomenon in India. Already 
in 1956 the States Reorganization Commission (src) suggested rearranging the 
administrative boundaries of states after independence to accommodate various 
demands for linguistically more homogenous states. Since then the number of 
states has doubled to twenty-eight, the last three (Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttara-
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khand) being created in the year 2000.1 In July 2013 the Indian Government 
further announced it would give in to the long-standing demand of Telangana in 
Andhra Pradesh. Other demands for more autonomy were accommodated by grant-
ing local self-government through the Sixth Schedule or other forms of autonomous 
councils.2 But despite this broad internal reorganization of India, in addition to 
Gorkhaland there are still about thirty demands for new states in various areas of the 
country, including “Vidharba” (in Maharastha), “Bundelkhand” (in Uttar Pradesh 
and Madhya Pradesh), and “Bodoland” (in Assam), to name but a few. 
Other studies often interpret the processes behind this internal remapping 
as reflecting tensions between a pan-Indian national ideal on the one hand and 
regionalist aspirations of groups seeking more autonomy, recognition of their cul-
tures, and better prospects for development on the other (for example, Chadda 
2002; Bhattacharyya 2005; Prabhakara 2009). Recurrent discussions in this 
context include the question of whether regional demands challenge the integ-
rity of the Indian state and could lead to a “Balkanization”—or the breaking into 
pieces—of India (Shah 2010), elaborations on the advantages or disadvantages of 
smaller states (Beck et al. 2010), or India’s ability to deal with such demands within 
its federal set-up (Bhattacharyya 2005; Sarangi 2009). Often these authors 
describe the relations between nationalism and regional movements as opposi-
tional and employ a dualistic vocabulary, separating and juxtaposing regionalism 
and nationalism as distinct processes regardless of whether they see the former as 
a threat or a possible merit to the broader project of nation-building. This inher-
ent dualism becomes apparent in formulations such as “India… faces the prob-
lem of negotiating between segmented identities… and a pan-Indian nationalism. 
How is micro accommodated by macro?” (Behera 2007, 86), or “Mainstream 
Indian nationalism had continuously to grapple with regional nationalism” (Bhat-
tacharyya 2005, 11). There is often an underlying assumption that regionalism 
poses a threat to the pan-Indian ideal if it is not “contained” (Behera 2007, 91; 
Chadda 2002, 44), suggesting an a priori conflict between the national and not-
yet-nationalized regional. 
Although I certainly do not deny that tensions can (and most times do) emerge 
from demands for more autonomy posed by regionally based groups, I want to 
express caution in juxtaposing terms and categories of the “national” and “pan-
Indian,” “central” and the “regional,” or the “micro” and “macro.” These dichot-
omies easily suggest that regionalism and pan-Indian nationalism are opposed to 
each other a priori instead of asking what role regionalist movements could pos-
sibly play for the formation of an Indian nationalism itself. 
I want to challenge such dualisms by proposing a di5erent way to approach the 
relations between regionalism and nationalism by understanding them to be mutu-
ally enforcing and dependent processes rather than as oppositional dynamics. I pro-
pose that ethno-regional movements seeking more autonomy—often described as 
challenging the Indian “nation”—do not necessarily oppose pan-Indian ideals but 
rather form part of their production and reproduction in multiple processes and at 
di5erent levels of society. The movement for a new union state of Gorkhaland to 
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be carved out of Darjeeling district and its adjoining areas in northern West Bengal 
serves as a case study to underline my argument. 
Analytically, I focus on narratives displayed in the form of imaginative geographies 
that are laden with references to ethno-symbolic resources and form an important 
strategy for movement legitimation and mobilization. The strategic construction of 
such imaginative geographies by movement leaders not only constructs an ethnic 
region that is to become a new union state but, at the same time, also reproduces 
the ideological principles of nationalism at multiple levels of society. Through a 
closer analysis of such arguments, I also want to contribute to an understanding of 
what “Indian nationalism” means for people in Darjeeling.
The article is structured as follows: first, I outline the ways in which scholars 
have attempted to challenge common assumptions reflecting a dualist thinking 
about nation and region. Thereafter I briefly outline the concept of imaginative 
geographies and its merits in an analysis of ethno-regionalist movements. In the 
empirical section I analyze the ways in which Gorkhaland is constructed within the 
broader frame of a nationalist ideology. 
The national in the local: thinking about  
ethno-regionalism differently
The research questions outlined demand some conceptual considerations 
on ethno-regionalism or subnationalism and their relations to nationalism, partic-
ularly in the Indian context. I will first introduce Anthony Smith’s approach to the 
emergence of national groups and demonstrate how far it is inherently spatial by 
relating it to geographical research on “regions” and “regional identities.” Finally, 
I introduce approaches that challenge the common dualist view on the relation-
ships between the “regional” and the “national,” and propose a way of researching 
these relations in the context of statehood movements in India.
One convincing approach to the emergence of nationalism and nations was 
introduced by Anthony Smith, who defines nations as “a named human popu-
lation sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, pub-
lic culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members” 
(Smith 1996a, 359). In addition to modernist and materialist approaches (see for 
example Gellner 1996) he stresses that ethnic ties and memories are indispen-
sible for nations and nationalisms to emerge. Smith identified three bases or “deep 
resources” on which nationalisms can draw: collective memories of a rich ethno-
history and a golden age, belief in ethnic election, and belonging to an ancestral 
homeland (Smith 1996b). These resources form a repertoire for leaders to draw 
on to mobilize people to participate in nationalist movements (Smith 1996b, 591). 
Narratives and myths reflecting collective memories are used especially to forge 
such connections between people and a territory. A particular territory or land-
scape is historicized as a place of an ethnic group’s origin, migration, settlement, 
or golden age, a place where the ancestors rest and one that provided the setting 
for events and experiences of that community (Smith 1996b, 589). 
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Ethno-nationalism therefore always has a spatial base. These relations between 
ethno-nationalism and space are captured by the term “ethno-regionalism”; this 
links it to the process of “regionalization,” which has been well researched in geog-
raphy (Agnew 1999; MacLeod and Jones 2001; Paasi 2002; 1996). Regional-
ization refers to the manifold cultural, political, and economic processes through 
which regions come into being and which are reflected in collective social classi-
fications, identifications, and practices. These processes include the production of 
hegemonic narratives of a specific regional entity and identity (Paasi 2002), such 
as narratives about a “golden age.” Werlen (1995) highlights the conflicts arising 
from contested regionalizations. He views regionalization as an “oppositional form 
of geography making,” a territorially motivated argumentation or social move-
ment on the subnational level challenging representatives at the national decision-
making center (Werlen 1995, 366). Regionalist movements demand a reordering 
of the political geographies of power expressed as a redrawing of administrative 
boundaries of control—as is evident with the ethno-regional movements in India.
But how do such ethno-regional or ethno-nationalist movements stand in the 
broader pan-Indian nationalist ideal? How can we avoid a priori dualist thinking 
of both ethno-regionalisms and (pan-Indian) nationalism? Research on the “social 
construction of scale” (Agnew 1997; Brenner 2001; Marston 2000; Smith 
1992) has dealt with and challenged common assumptions about our thinking of 
the world as divided into “local,” “regional,” “national,” or “global” units and 
might o5er helpful ways to reconceptualize the relations between these seemingly 
objective divisions. In this body of work, scale—rather than being a fixed and 
objective entity—is understood as being socially constructed, historically contin-
gent, and dependent on social and political practices and struggles (Paasi 2004, 
542). It is a way of framing conceptions of reality (Marston 2000, 221). The banal 
as well as scientific dualist understanding of the “national” and the “regional” is 
part of the process of “scaling.” As Marston stresses, this scale-making is not only a 
rhetoric practice but also has consequences in real life. Among these is the produc-
tion of boundaries that separate spatial units and arranges them into a hierarchical 
order (Brenner 2001). Such boundary-making entails the organization of dif-
ference in a geographical way, including the “making of identities” (Smith 1992; 
Paasi 2004). Such spatial positioning (Verortung; Lossau 2002) also takes place 
within nation-states and can be described as “internal Orientalism,” a “discourse 
that operates within the boundaries of a state” and “involves the othering of a 
(relatively) weak region by a more powerful region (or regions) within a state” 
(Jansson 2003, 296). Such processes of inclusion and exclusion involved in the 
making of identities can be understood and analyzed as resulting from the social 
production of scale (Smith 1992). This underlines that the production of scale is 
inherently political (Paasi 2004). 
Categories such as the “nation” or “ethnicity” can also be seen as “templates for 
representing and organizing social knowledge, frames for articulating social com-
parisons and explanations, and filters that govern what is noticed or unnoticed” 
(Brubaker 2009, 34). This “cognitive turn” in the study of ethnicity and nation-
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alism builds on this approach and focuses on the processes by which such categories 
are employed and thereby reproduced in the everyday interactions, identifications, 
and representations of individuals (Brubaker 2009, 34). Nations and national 
identities are socially constituted in the manifold localized ways of performing 
national identity (Thompson 2001). Such an approach suggests that the “nation” 
is produced in the “local” and thereby denies an a priori division of the two. 
This understanding is also reflected in Agnew and Brusa’s (1999) study on 
the regionalist Northern League in Italy. They highlight that people have political 
identities “in which a number of territorial and social dimensions intersect” (128). 
One can feel a!liated to his or her region without challenging the belonging to 
an imagined nation. In a similar way, Sanjib Baruah challenges an a priori dual-
ism between region and nation in his research on Assamese subnationalism. He 
stresses that “subnational ‘imagined communities’… coexist with the pan-Indian 
national ‘imagined community’” (Baruah 1997, 501, emphasis added), although 
they are occasionally in tension with this (Baruah 1999, 5). By using the term 
“subnationalism”—referring “to a pattern of politicization and mobilization that 
meets some of the criteria of nationalism, but is not committed firmly to the idea 
of separate statehood [in the form of a separate nation-state]” (Baruah 1999, 
8)—instead of regionalism, Baruah points out that the set of ideas and the ideol-
ogy of both nationalism and subnationalism are the same or at least similar, and 
that there is a “dialogical relationship” (Baruah 1999, 5) between the two. He 
demonstrates how Assamese subnationalism is shaped by pan-Indian intellectual 
horizons (for example, the notion of linguistic states) that constitute a “pan-Indian 
grammar,” (Baruah 1999, 7) which again informed Assamese subnational mobi-
lization. He suggests that, to a certain degree, regionalist rhetoric is itself shaped 
and informed by what is considered “national.” 
In his analysis of the emergence of nationalism in Bengal, Kaviraj (1992, 2) 
even goes a step further by highlighting that “nationalism must speak a traditional 
language of communities.” National identities, like regional identities, are con-
structs emerging over time. They are not “pre-mordial,” traditional phenomena 
but result from the same processes through which the Indian nation came into being 
in the context of modernization (Kaviraj 1992, 23). 
These authors not only suggest that the national and regional identities and 
a!liations do not necessarily exclude each other but that they even share a similar 
“grammar” of existence. In the remainder of this article I want to focus on how 
this relationship can be understood from the view of a regionalist movement. In 
order to understand how this subnationalism relates to pan-Indian nationalism, it is 
necessary to analyze the ways this movement formulates and legitimates its demand 
for a new union state, whether its rhetoric reflects the ideas of an Indian nation, 
and what these ideas are. Radcli5e and Westwood have shown that an analysis of 
collective “imaginative geographies” is a helpful tool to understand the processes 
by which “national identities and nations are embedded in the material and imagi-
native spatialities of collective and individual subjects (Radcliffe and Westwood 
1996, 23). In their study on Latin American nationalism the authors analyze the 
wenner: “gorkhaland,” autonomy, and belonging | 205
ways people think about the nation spatially and how their regional geographical 
imaginations are shaped by and in turn reshape and challenge what is considered as 
“national.” Radcli5e defines imaginative geographies as “descriptions and discur-
sive constructs around place which are made and remade within a particular cul-
tural setting” (Radcliffe 1998, 275). Such imaginative geographies are not only 
expressions of a mental appropriation of space but also of the power to define and 
interpret the world (Gregory 1995) and draw distinctions between the “own” and 
the “other” (Lossau 2002, 76). They can serve to legitimize the physical appro-
priation of space (Gregory 1995, 463) and thereby attain a strategic character in 
the form of selective representations and descriptions of a claimed territory (Reu-
ber 1999). In connection with ethno-symbolic resources, imaginative geographies 
become powerful tools to legitimize claims on territory and to mobilize people to 
take part in the struggle for self-determination (Bishokarma 2012). Such imagina-
tive geographies link narratives and history to a particular space and endow it with 
meaning. Through this, they produce ethnic regions or ethno-scapes (Schetter 
and Weissert 2007) that proclaim the togetherness of a group of people with their 
territory. The question, then, is whether such ethno-regional imaginative geogra-
phies directly or indirectly relate to the imaginative geography of an Indian nation.
Imagining gorkhaland, producing the nation: 
from statehood to regional autonomy and back
A stroll through the green hills and tea gardens of Darjeeling hardly 
evokes the violent and dynamic history that the place has witnessed and is still 
witnessing. Having successively been part of the former Kingdom of Sikkim, Bhu-
tan, and the Gorkha Kingdom (present-day Nepal), in 1835 it was given as a Deed 
of Grant from Sikkim to the East India Company. After the Anglo-Bhutan war in 
1866, the district was completed by adding today’s Kalimpong subdivision and the 
Dooars area at the southern fringe of Bhutan. Although Darjeeling was added to 
the Bengal Presidency, it retained a special administrative status as an “excluded” 
and “scheduled” district and as a “backward tract” so that rules and regulations 
regarding landownership and taxes did not automatically apply until after the 
instruction of the governor. This was intended to safeguard the population—who 
were considered tribal—from exploitation by outsiders (Samanta 2000, 23). After 
independence, Darjeeling became part of West Bengal. Today West Bengal consists 
of three hill subdivisions, Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Kurseong, that are domi-
nated by a Nepali-speaking population, and the Siliguri subdivision in the plains. 
The Dooars—an area with a mixed population—are now part of Jalpaiguri district. 
From 1835, the British colonialists started developing Darjeeling as a hill station. 
This process not only entailed the construction of roads and infrastructure but also 
the creation of tea estates. Yet, as Darjeeling was only sparsely inhabited, the Brit-
ish enticed numerous laborers from Nepal, promising them a better life outside 
the repressive Rana regime and a good income from working on the plantations, 
in road construction, or in the army (Samanta 2000). Although these Nepalese—
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who soon became the majority in Darjeeling—belonged to di5erent caste, ethnic, 
and language groups, Nepali became the lingua franca, and slowly an identity as 
being “Gorkha” emerged (Samanta 2000, 23; Subba 1992, 65). The first demands 
for autonomy were formulated as early as 1907 by the “hill people” stressing the 
geographical, racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural di5erences between them-
selves and other groups in Bengal (Samanta 2000, 232; Subba 1992, 76). In the 
following years various such demands were posed by di5erent parties. One of these 
included the idea of “Gorkhasthan” to include the areas of Nepal, Darjeeling, 
and Sikkim, proposed by the Communist Party of India in 1947. Neither of these 
demands succeeded, and eventually in 1986, the peaceful struggle for autonomy 
turned violent under the banner of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (gnlf) 
and its leader Subash Ghisingh who coined the term “Gorkhaland.” 
Ghisingh based his rhetoric mainly on the perceived political insecurity of Indian 
Nepalis that reflects a perception of not being fully recognized Indian citizens but, 
rather, of being stigmatized as people coming from Nepal. He explained this and 
the need for Gorkhaland as follows: 
It is by being known as West Bengal that… its people a!rm their Indian identity 
which is di5erent from the identity of the people of Bangladesh who also are 
Bengalis. We Indian Nepalis who have nothing to do with Nepal are constantly 
confused with “Nepalis,” that is, citizens of Nepal, a foreign country. But if there 
is Gorkhaland then our identity as Indians belonging to an Indian state… will 
be clear. If there is no Gorkhaland, we will continue to be identified as Nepalis, 
under the stigma of being citizens of a foreign country residing here out of 
courtesy.  
 (Subash Ghisingh in Frontline 1986 (August), cited in Lama 1994, 52) 
This view, which still sums up the main arguments of the Gorkhaland move-
ment, was fueled by the violent evictions of Nepali-speaking groups from North-
east India in the early 1980s. In his famous speeches that were distributed on audio 
cassettes to various places in Darjeeling and the adjoining Dooars, Ghising called 
attention to the Indian Nepalis’ political insecurity and the threat of expulsion and 
contrasted it with the vision of Gorkhaland and its provision of security. 
The two-year-long violent agitation for the new state, where Ghisingh’s gnlf 
fought against members of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (cpi-m), backed 
by the central government’s forces, that opposed the demand for statehood, even-
tually ended in 1988 with an agreement to form the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Coun-
cil (dghc). Various landmarks and monuments testify to the violent civil war that 
left over twelve hundred people dead. The dghc, functioning under the jurisdic-
tion of the West Bengal state government, provided the Gorkhas some autonomy. 
Yet the council did not succeed in fulfilling the aspirations of the population; years 
of corruption and the violent oppression of oppositional voices (bolstered by the 
silent acceptance of the state government) caused a loss in public support for Ghis-
ingh (Benedikter 2009; Chakrabarty 2005; Lacina 2009). Finally, his idea to 
bring Darjeeling under the Sixth Schedule while presumably giving up the demand 
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for statehood and failing to support the candidateship of Prashant Tamang in the 
Indian Idol competition triggered a public rebellion against him.3 
In October 2007, a new party, the Gorkha Liberation Front (glf), was estab-
lished. Led by Bimal Gurung, previously Ghisingh’s right-hand man, the glf started 
a new agitation for Gorkhaland, entailing various bandhs (general strikes), demon-
strations, pada-yatras (foot marches) to the demanded territories, hunger strikes, 
and tax boycotts. Although the party stressed that its movement was democratic, 
Gandhian, and nonviolent, other Darjeeling-based Gorkha parties accused it of vio-
lently oppressing oppositional voices, including the forceful expulsion of former 
gnlf leaders, and murderers. In July 2011, the glf signed a tripartite agreement 
with the newly elected state government under Trinamool Congress (tmc) leader 
Mamata Banerjee and the Central Government for another autonomous council, 
the Gorkhaland Territorial Adminsitration (gta) that was established in August 
2012 and has now replaced the previous dghc. Other Gorkha parties in Darjeeling 
strongly oppose this agreement and accuse the glf of having sold out their demand 
for a separate state, although the glf claims that the gta is a step to statehood.
In the next section, I focus on the di5erent imaginative geographies that are 
evoked to legitimize the Gorkhas’ claim for a separate state, Gorkhaland. These 
imaginative geographies not only reflect their demand for separation from West 
Bengal by stressing their distinctiveness and original ownership of the land, but 
also the will to belong to the Indian nation.4 While such imaginations are mainly 
evoked by political leaders in o!cial statements, speeches, and interviews, they 
are also reflected in statements of the residents, including tea garden dwellers and 
workers, in Darjeeling. This analysis is based on interviews with political leaders 
of di5erent Darjeeling-based Gorkha parties5 and tea plantation workers that I 
conducted during field trips in 2011 and 2012. Further emphasis is taken from 
the o!cial glf-pamphlets “Why Gorkhaland?” (glf 2009) and “The case for 
Gorkhaland” (glf 2008), a report that was presented to the government. 
Imaginations of Separation: Drawing Boundaries
In India the decision to create new states lies with the central government and is 
constitutionally anchored in Article 3 that allows for the creation of new states or 
changing the boundaries of existing ones. It is therefore necessary for the Gorkhas 
to convince the central government of their eligibility to self-rule. One way of 
legitimation is the evoking of imaginative geographies that connect narratives of 
ethnic election, a golden age, and a belief in a homeland (Smith 1996a; 1996b) to 
the territory demanded, thus forging a regional identity among the Gorkhas and 
presenting them as a distinct ethnic group. 
Darjeeling as a different place: belief in ethnic election
Stemming from the ideal of “chosenness,” the belief in ethnic election 
is part of a nationalist doctrine that expresses a nation’s authentic identity and 
its distinctive and original ethnic culture: “A nation must possess its individual-
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ity, its peculiar history and destiny, and thereby reveal its unique contribution, its 
‘irreplaceable culture values,’ to the world” (Smith 1996c, 453). The leaders of 
the Gorkha parties in Darjeeling express this nationalist doctrine by evoking two 
imaginative geographies. They construct Darjeeling first as a “di5erent place” and 
second as a “center of all Indian Gorkhas.” According to Alok Thulung, an a!li-
ate of the glf, stressing the di5erences with West Bengal is important in order to 
legitimize the Gorkhas’ demand for Gorkhaland. Di5erences are not only stressed 
with regard to culture and language (in Darjeeling, Nepali is the common lan-
guage, while in Bengal, Bengali is spoken) but also to physical and topographical 
characteristics of the hilly terrain and climate that presumably make the Gorkhas a 
“distinct race” (Thulung 2008). 
Cultural di5erences were also expressed during the agitation for Gorkhaland 
where the glf had directed people to wear typical Nepali attire, such as chaubandi 
cholo, daura suruwal, or dhaka topis,6 in Darjeeling to mark it as a place with an 
original ethnic culture. History is also mobilized to legitimize the demand for sep-
aration: the Gorkha leaders refer to Darjeeling’s historical status as an “excluded” 
and “scheduled district” to emphasize that it had never been an integral part of 
Bengal, and that the proposed area of Gorkhaland had never been possessed by 
any king of the “plains of Bengal.” Instead, it was incorporated from Sikkim and 
Bhutan through various treaties with foreign countries (glf 2009, 415). H. B. 
Chettri, media spokesperson of the glf, argues that “The government should rec-
ognize the fact that since the place is di5erent, you need to be treated di5erently. 
It needs a di5erent kind of administration” (interview, Kalimpong, Feburary 2011). 
He thereby legitimates the demand for separation.
At the same time the Gorkhas try to draw a line between themselves and citizens of 
Nepal. Although they admit the many similarities regarding physical appearance and 
culture, they constantly emphasize that they are not from Nepal. For example, very 
often my interviewees in the tea gardens stressed that their Nepali and the Nepali 
spoken in Nepal were di5erent from each other and that their society was more open 
and not as exclusive as Nepal’s, especially regarding the rigidity of the caste system. 
A second imaginative geography, reflecting the belief in ethnic election, portrays 
Darjeeling as the “center of all Indian Gorkhas.” R. B. Rai (the president of cprm) 
explains that Darjeeling was a “social, political, and symbolic center” for all Indian 
Gorkhas and therefore the main place of the movement to include the Nepali lan-
guage in the Indian constitution (interview, Darjeeling, 2011). Furthermore, the 
population perceives Darjeeling as belonging to the Gorkhas simply because they 
are the majority there. The Lepchas, who are considered to be the indigenous 
population of Darjeeling, and the Bhutias are described as minority groups by the 
Gorkhas (glf 2009, 16).
As a result of these imaginations of “Darjeeling as a di5erent place,” and “Dar-
jeeling as the center of all Gorkhas,” boundaries between Bengalis and Gorkhas are 
being drawn while the Gorkhas express their uniqueness. Darjeeling is described as 
a linguistically and culturally homogenous place—a criterion based on which the 
States Reorganization Commission in 1956 redrew the administrative boundaries 
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after Indian independence (glf 2008, 23). In this context the glf also refers to 
Nehru’s standpoint and the Indian National Congress’ suggestion of having a fed-
eration “allowing internal autonomy to its various homogenous constituent units” 
(Congress 1928, cited in glf 2008, 23). The emphasis on individuality and di5er-
ence is thereby linked to broader principles of the organization of space in India.
Darjeeling as a once wealthy place: 
shared memories of a golden age
Smith’s ethno-symbolic approach stresses the importance of the shared 
memories of the collective experiences of a group claiming a common origin and 
ancestry in the production of an ethnic identity (Smith 1996b, 583). In particular, 
idealized memories of a golden age define a normative standard to formulate and 
evaluate the current position of a group. The ideal of a golden age further induces 
a sense of regeneration, of renewal, and restoration to a former glorious state con-
trasting with perceptions of inner decline and alienation. This “national rebirth” 
is closely linked to a sense of collective destiny: “The road that the community 
expects to take in each generation is inspired and shaped by its memories of former 
heroic ages” (Smith 1996b, 584). Golden ages establish a link between the past 
and future of a community in a certain space. 
The Gorkhas’ argumentation for a separate state also indirectly reflects the 
belief in such a golden age. Darjeeling is imagined as a place of previous wealth 
that was lost. Wealth and development are associated with the colonial period, and 
the decline with the neglect of the West Bengal administration after independence. 
This is clear in the following statement of H. B. Chettri, (interviewed at Kalim-
pong, February 2011): 
Whatever wealth the colony had created here during the regime—the British 
regime—nothing was added by Bengal or… by independent India. You look in 
terms of infrastructure, the water supply, whatever the British had planned for 
3,000 people in Darjeeling town, is over 3 lakhs [300,000] now, but nothing 
was added. Look at the roads, it is getting worse, look at the institutions: all 
institutions worth its name were created by British. If you minus them… it is 
something like.… English literature without Shakespeare.
The place that was first [in] catering to the needs of West Bengal has become 
impoverished due to the state’s discriminative policies.
It was not only political leaders who associate wealth with the colonial time. 
Some tea plantation laborers also stressed that the only development that had ever 
taken place in Darjeeling had been during the colonial time whereas after indepen-
dence the place was neglected and the wealth declined. One of my friends even 
suggested that the British should return to bring the place in order. Also part of 
this narrative of decline is the perceived threat posed by Bangladeshi migrants who 
are now the majority population in what were previously Nepali strongholds such 
as Siliguri and the Dooars. Gorkhaland is believed to be able to recreate Darjeeling 
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and revive its previous wealth, mainly in terms of development that is evaluated 
against the backdrop of an idealized British colonial time.7 This argument adds 
to the perception of di5erence—but in rather negative terms. The imagination of 
Darjeeling as a neglected place provides an explanation for poverty and decline 
that is contrasted with the redemptive idea of Gorkhaland. The only way to return 
the wealth would be the creation of a separate state and self-government according 
to the specific needs of the place, as H. B. Chettri noted in his interview: 
So, once and for all if you want to resolve this [identity] crisis we will create a 
state. Create a state that will put it right. Then nobody will ask you: where are 
you from? And your developmental agendas are taken care of, you are there to 
rule yourself. 
The imagination of Gorkhaland carries the promise of self-realization (see also 
Smith 1996b), thereby attaining a strong mobilizing potential for the population 
and again stressing the need towards the central government of separation from 
West Bengal in order to become a thriving part of India.
Darjeeling as the place of the ancestors:  
the territorialization of memory
The territorialization of memory refers to a process whereby shared mem-
ories are attached to particular territories so that they become historic homelands 
and ethno-scapes (Smith 1996c, 453). Territorial boundaries of nations derive their 
significance from the memories associated with them, and particular geographical 
areas provide the scene for historic events such as migrations or battles and func-
tion as the locus of settlement (Smith 1996b, 589). Through this process, shared 
memories become national (Smith 1996c, 453). Narratives make the landscape an 
indispensable element of a community’s history so that specific spaces become an 
“ancestral homeland,” thereby fostering territorial demands (Smith 1996b, 589; 
1996c, 454). In the rhetoric of the Gorkha parties, Darjeeling also has such a his-
tory of appropriation through its ancestors. According to H. B. Chettri in his inter-
view at Kalimpong, “everything that Darjeeling is today is the blood and sweat of 
our ancestors; it is not some Banerjee or Chatterjee [Bengali names] who created 
Darjeeling.”
By saying this H. B. Chettri draws not only a line between the Gorkhas and 
Bengalis but also a direct connection between body (“blood and sweat”) and 
land. Further, Darjeeling is the place where the ancestors of today’s Gorkhas once 
migrated from Nepal. Although people in Darjeeling today stress that they are 
genuine Indian citizens, the common experience of migration and the creation of 
a new society outside “home” can be regarded as a shared memory. Yet, to prove 
the Gorkhas’ indigenousness, a leader of Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangh stresses that 
they had not only migrated during the British colonial time but had already been 
dwelling there previously and were incorporated into British India “together with 
their land” (interview with Enos Das Pradhan, Kalimpong, Feburary 2011).
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Another shared memory is the violent agitation for statehood in 1986 and 1987. 
There is hardly a village in Darjeeling that did not experience fights and killings 
between the gnlf and the cpi-m, and by the roadside there are many monuments 
for the martyrs that died during that time, thus keeping their memories alive. Fur-
ther, the violence in 1986 was a recurrent topic in interviews, and people remember 
the hardship and the fear during that dark chapter of their history. The memories 
are also kept alive on Martyrs’ Day (27 July) where political parties organize meet-
ings to pay tribute to those who died in the struggle for their own state. This ter-
ritorialization of memory clearly underlines the Gorkhas’ perceived “right” to the 
land as well as establishing a close link between people, their history, and place.
Darjeeling as a “national” ethno-scape
In summary, by reference to the ethno-symbolic resources, the Gorkhas 
attempt to legitimize their demand for a new administrative boundary between 
Darjeeling and West Bengal, while at the same time drawing on deep resources to 
mobilize the population for an ethno-nationalist struggle. Imaginative geographies 
of Darjeeling connect the demanded territory to narratives and shared memories. 
Through this rhetoric, a “regional identity” (Paasi 2002) is created, a collective 
identification of people with their region. Darjeeling becomes a space of “Gorkhas,” 
an “ethno-scape,” (Smith 1996c, 453), where self-realization is possible. 
Yet, while such rhetoric easily evokes the picture of a group forging only an ethnic 
identity and regional belonging, a closer look reveals that this goes beyond simplis-
tic regionalist propaganda. The aspiration for self-determination is itself formulated 
in the language of nationalism: the expression of uniqueness and individuality, the 
emotional evocation of a lost golden age, and the historical merger of people and 
place not only support the mobilization of the population and forge an ethno-
national identity but also refer to principles that are explicitly formulated in Indian 
history and its constitution. In particular, the principle of linguistically and cultur-
ally homogenous states—which served as the major basis for India’s reorganization 
in 1956—provides a reference point for the Gorkhas who portray Darjeeling as a 
di5erent place with di5erent people. The following illustrates this point: “In India, 
language has provided an obvious basis for the formation of separate states, because 
linguistic groups are also culturally distinct societies” (glf 2008, 21).
Stressing di5erences between Darjeeling and the “rest” of West Bengal must 
be understood as an attempt to become recognized as an eligible, unique nation 
worthwhile of getting its own state, as uniqueness and ethnic election are the 
nationalist principles based on which other states were granted to other groups 
such as the Punjabis, the Tamils, or Maharathis.8 The presentation of Darjeeling as 
a di5erent place is therefore not only part of the strategy to separate from Bengal 
but also a reflection of genuine criteria based on which Indian federalism rests. At 
the same time the Gorkha representatives refer to the leitmotif of “unity in diver-
sity” (bgp 2011)—diversity is a part of belonging—and stress that uniqueness and 
individuality forge such diversity while demanding the right to self-determination 
212 | Asian Ethnology 72/2 ? 2013
for a distinct group in a historically chosen place. The following section extends 
this argument by focusing on how Gorkhaland itself fits into the broader set-up of 
an imagined Indian nation and how the relations between the two are constructed 
in the rhetoric of Gorkha leaders and the broader public. 
Imaginations of Belonging: Integrating into the National Mainstream
As already mentioned, the demand for Gorkhaland is not solely about divisions 
and the creation of ethno-scapes in order to stress the Gorkhas’ uniqueness and 
right to territory. At the heart of the demand for Gorkhaland stands the promise 
of a better life for all Indian Gorkhas. This promise not only includes prospects 
for better employment, higher salaries, more educational facilities, and improved 
infrastructure but mainly the promise of a full recognition of the Gorkhas as genu-
ine Indian citizens enjoying full rights and being secure from ethnic violence and 
expulsion. The aim of the Gorkhas is to convince the Indian government of their 
belonging. Also, this will to belong is expressed in imaginative geographies that 
aim at depicting Gorkhaland as a genuine building block and part of the Indian 
nation. 
Gorkhaland as part of india: 
recognition of an indian identity
Gorkhaland-opposed associations, headed by Bengali and Adivasi groups 
mainly based in the Terai and Dooars, claim that the demand for Gorkhaland is 
secessionist and its true motive is the attempt to create a “Greater Nepal,” thereby 
destroying Indian integrity and threatening her security. Contrary to this, the 
Gorkhas stress that their “politics of identity” is not “antithetical to the existence 
of pan-Indian nationalism and national integration.… Indian nationality… is a 
matter of privilege and proud possession, not a liability” (glf 2008, 2). 
This adherence to the Indian nation is also expressed by using the term “sub-
nationalism” and an understanding of its simultaneous emergence with Indian 
nationalism: 
The development of the Gorkha subnationalism coincides with the development 
of Indian nationalism. Though India was famously known as a great civilization, 
the making of the Indian nation was a modern phenomenon that developed 
since the last hundred and fifty years.… The rise of Indian nationalism was wit-
nessed among the di5erent regions and its people through their own language 
and culture. (glf 2008, 3) 
Indian nationalism is understood as emerging out of diversity, and the Gorkhas 
are presented as a “vibrant part of the country’s diversity” (glf 2008, 32). This 
suggests that the Gorkha leaders do not understand the relationship between 
regionalism and nationalism in oppositional terms but rather as being mutually 
supportive. R. B. Rai, the president of cprm, underlined this conception by saying 
“We Nepalese are as un-Indian like Indians.” 
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However, the Gorkhas’ integration into the Indian Union, they claim, has not 
been successfully completed as the Gorkhas were often regarded as foreigners 
coming from Nepal: 
The overwhelming support for Gorkhaland stems from the great irony that 
Indian Gorkhas, in spite of having been an integral part of the Indian union, are 
constantly being viewed as aliens. (glf 2008, 20) 
Patriotic Indian Gorkhas have always wanted to have a home within India. Theirs 
is an angst of belonging, not of separating. (glf 2008, 29)
This has serious implications for their feelings of security as they fear eviction 
similar to that of the Lhotsampas of Bhutan or the Nepali-speaking Indians from 
parts of Northeast India in the 1980s. The fact that tea plantation dwellers do not 
possess any land certificates as their houses are built on government leasehold land 
underscores this insecurity. The claim of gnlf-leader Subash Ghisingh that Dar-
jeeling was a “no-man’s-land” whose national status was not clear contributes to 
this general feeling of de-territorialization. 
The Gorkha leaders propose that the only way out of this misery is to o!cially 
declare Darjeeling and its adjoining areas a separate union state with a constitutional 
guarantee. Only then, they believe, would other Indians recognize them as equally 
enjoying the full rights of citizenship. Geographical space and boundaries play a 
decisive role in this argumentation, as outlined in the following two statements:
Since it is geographical space that will ease the way out of this half-consummated 
national life for the Gorkhas, it is quite clear that a state of their own is now 
imperative for them to assert a full Indian identity—a state that roots them to 
India, a state that they can give as an address should someone in.… Delhi ask 
them where they come from, a state that tells everyone that an Indian Gorkha is 
not a migrant from a neighboring country but a landholder in India.  
 (glf 2008, 31)
[I]t is the delineation of geographical boundaries that gives a community—or a 
nation—an identity as a political entity. (glf 2008, 30) 
Additionally, Gorkhaland would also foster the participation of Gorkhas in 
Indian politics:
A separate state would provide them [the Indian Gorkhas] a political identity 
and a constitutionally documented institutional space for interest articulation 
and protection within the broader territorial boundary of India. (glf 2008, 20)
This conviction about the identity-creating power of territory and boundaries not 
only reflects the general belief in a basic nation-state but also expresses the feeling 
that political participation in India can only be attained through the establishment of 
their own state; only a state would guarantee, as H. B. Chettri put it, a “direct link 
to the government.” The separate state of Gorkhaland in this context becomes the 
guarantor for justice, participation, equality, and recognition. 
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Gorkhaland as a fortress: fostering national security
To support their genuine will to belong to the Indian nation, the Gorkha 
leaders also stress the Gorkhas’ contribution to nation building, first during the 
independence struggle, and second through the defense of national security at the 
outer boundaries of India by sending “the best of their young men to guard the 
nation’s frontiers” (glf 2008, 33). The Indian Gorkhas are portrayed as patriots 
securing the “freedom of the country” (glf 2008, 33). Gorkhaland as an “enclave 
of social soldiers and patriotic citizens” holds the promise to be a “fort” against 
foreign incursion in the geographically sensitive area of the so-called “Chicken’s 
neck” (glf 2008, 34), the small corridor connecting the Indian mainland with its 
conflict ridden northeast. This loyalty is also expressed in the way the glf describes 
its movement as being “democratic,” “nonviolent,” and “Gandhian” (glf 2009, 
1), thereby reflecting respected principles of the Indian national movement. Addi-
tionally, all regional parties stress that their statehood demand was “constitu-
tional,” thereby referring to Article 3 of the Indian constitution that provides for 
the creation of new states. Darjeeling is evoked as a place of loyal Gorkhas obeying 
the rules and values of the Indian constitution. By saying this, the leaders not only 
connect the demand for Gorkhaland to the national security discourse but also 
to a scr principle which holds that the creation of new states should endorse the 
“preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India” (glf 2009, 1). 
Reproducing the nation
The above analysis has shown that the Gorkhas prove their belonging to 
the Indian nation by referring to national values, such as to the constitution and 
democracy, nation building, national security and integrity, and the principle of lin-
guistic federal states. At the same time, the way in which the demand for Gorkhaland 
is formulated also reflects a specific socio-spatial imagination of the Indian nation-
state itself, which can be summarized in the following four points: belief in the fed-
eralist set-up, belief in the principle of “unity in diversity,” belief in togetherness of a 
nation and space (ethno-scape), and belief in boundaries and territorial units.
The principles of India’s hierarchical administrative organization with its states 
and districts are not challenged in the Gorkhas’ rhetoric; rather, the political leaders 
accept (and thereby reproduce) this scalar set-up. At the same time, however, they 
are challenging the ways in which relations between such hierarchically ordered levels 
are conceptualized and boundaries between such levels are drawn. This rhetoric is 
an attempt to contest a perceived “internal Orientalism” (Jansson 2003, 296). The 
case of Gorkhaland clearly supports Johnson and Colemen’s (2012) argument that 
regions are not passive objects in this process but that they contest and resist such 
“internal othering” by contending alternative discourses about themselves. There-
fore they do not only criticize positions that see statehood movements as a threat to 
the Indian nation-state as such, but also challenge the spatial positioning (Verortung) 
(Lossau 2002) of their identities. In contrast, they stress their will to belong and to 
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integrate, attempting to reverse the dualistic perception of the national and the eth-
nically constituted regional, to create a picture where the regional state becomes part 
of the national and strengthens it. In other words, they want to bridge the boundar-
ies that are drawn in the social and political production of scale. The Gorkhas pro-
mote an imagination of India that views the national not as distinct and contradicting 
their ethnic a!liations; rather, they assume that the granting of a state within the 
Indian union would give them their legitimate space and secure their acceptance 
in the Indian polity, helping them to integrate into the Indian “melting pot” (bgp 
2011) and thereby contribute to India’s unity. It is thus the creation of administrative 
boundaries and a separation from West Bengal that the Gorkhas believe would bring 
about their integration, providing them with a fully-fledged and recognized Indian 
identity. This belief is strongly reflected in the statements of Darjeeling’s popula-
tion—as the example at the beginning of this article demonstrates—who hardly ever 
question whether their own state would really bring about the envisaged changes. 
This belief in the instrumentality of their own circumscribed space for the sake 
of becoming a recognized part of the nation expresses a strong belief in the sym-
bolic power of space and territory in a federal set-up. The Indian space in this 
context resembles a container that is dissociated into separate units reflecting a 
unity between ethnicity and territory. This leads to an interesting reverse logic: the 
rhetoric through which the imagination of Gorkhaland is evoked only makes sense 
against the backdrop of the ideology of a territorial nation-state with boundar-
ies. The very logic of the nation-state thereby mutually shapes and reshapes the 
Gorkhas’ belief in an Indian identity through a state of their own. 
Conclusion: the regional production of 
gorkha-indian nationality
This article started by critically questioning assumptions about the dual-
istic nature of regionalism and nationalism. Departing from questions that ask 
about the merits or risks of smaller states and regionalisms for the integrity of the 
Indian state, I looked at the ways that regional movements ideologically relate 
to ideas of nationalism. An analysis of the rhetoric applied to the movement for 
Gorkhaland indeed revealed the multiple references to a “pan-Indian grammar” 
(Baruah 1999, 91). The political leaders of the Gorkha parties strategically formu-
late their demands in the ideological language of the (Indian) nation-state, reflect-
ing its basic ideas and principles.
To summarize, these ideas and principles are as follows: first, the idea of ter-
ritorially bounded ethno-scapes that express the unity of ethnicity and space 
(expressed by the reference to ethno-symbolic resources); second, the belief in 
Indian federalism and the fact that only their own state would guarantee partici-
pation and full recognition as Indians; third, adherence to the Indian constitu-
tion and principles of democracy and nonviolence; and finally the connection of 
the demand for Gorkhaland to the national security discourse. Through this the 
Gorkhas also reproduce the image of a scalar organization of the Indian nation, 
216 | Asian Ethnology 72/2 ? 2013
but they challenge the qualitative understanding of the “national” and “regional” 
scales as being opposed to each other. Thereby, they also object to the perceived 
“internal othering” of their region as being outside of the Indian imagination 
(Johnson and Coleman 2012).
This shows that subnationalism or regionalism are not only coexisting with a pan-
Indian ideal as claimed by Baruah (1997, 498), but that they even produce and 
reproduce it by using the same “grammar” of its formulation. Regionalism, at least in 
the case of Gorkhaland, does not therefore necessarily stand in opposition to nation-
alism but can rather be understood as forming part of its existence. A closer look 
reveals that distinguishing criteria of Indian nationalism, which had been designed 
to accommodate regionalist aspirations from the very beginning (for example, by 
allowing for the creation of new states), are reflected in this rhetoric. Instead of dis-
tinguishing the micro from the macro, where the macro is expected to accommodate 
the micro, I suggest understanding both as simultaneous processes. Certainly the 
Gorkhas’ explicit will to belong adds an important component to these processes. 
This production of the national is not yet confined to the circles of political lead-
ership. In various discussions with the local population residing on tea plantations, 
the same belief in the unity of space and ethnic group and that only a separate state 
would guarantee security and a recognized Indian identity was expressed. The imag-
ination of Gorkhaland carries not only a promise of development and self-govern-
ment but also of national recognition, participation, and respect. These discourses 
are part of the local processes by which the image of the nation is being produced.
It is the symbolic dimension of space that matters. A separate state is not simply 
a piece of land, it is also a genuine, constitutionally recognized part of the nation 
guaranteeing equal rights and obligations as other states and groups in India pre-
sumably already have. A separate state is not only a way of separating from West 
Bengal; for the Gorkhas it is mainly a strategy for national integration, adding 
another colorful part in India’s mosaic of language-cultural federalism.
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petence in Research North-South (nccr).
1. The criteria based on which new states were created has changed throughout Indian his-
tory. While in the beginning linguistic and cultural homogeneity were decisive factors, later 
on ethnic, economic, and environmental factors were taken into consideration (for a discus-
sion, see Bhattacharyya 2001 and Sarangi 2009).
2. The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides rights to autonomous self-
governance for tribal areas of Northeast India under the authority of the respective state 
government.
3. Originally from Darjeeling, Prashant Tamang’s candidature in the popular Indian Idol 
talent show in 2007 was not supported by Subash Ghisingh, furthering his alienation from 
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the population. Instead, Prashant was supported by Bimal Gurung who eventually utilized his 
popular support to establish a new party. 
4. This dualist argumentation of criticizing the respective union state while appealing to 
the goodwill of the center was also used by the movement for Uttarakhand (see Mawdsley 
1997)
5. These are the Communist Party of Revolutionary Marxists (cprm), the All India Gorkha 
League (aigl), and the national umbrella organization Indian Gorkha Council (Bharatiya 
Gorkha Parisangh, bgp).
6. Chaubandi cholo is a short coat twice folded on the front side worn by women. It is 
tied with four small ribbons and usually in the traditional colorful dhaka fabric. Some women 
wear it instead of the typical Sari blouse. Men wear the daura suruwal, the upper part con-
sisting of a knee-long tunic which is, like the chaubandi cholo, tied with four ribbons. A kind 
of harem pants form the lower part. The dhaka topi is a hat in the colorful dhaka fabric only 
worn by men. The glf allowed members of the Tibetan and Lepcha communities to wear 
their own traditional attire.
7. It is important to mention that in terms of working conditions on the tea plantation, the 
time of the British is not idealized at all; rather, elderly people stress the hardship they (and 
their parents) had to endure during that period.
8. It is a common among politicians and the general public to point to other communities 
in India that had “their own state,” such as the “Tamils have Tamil Nadu, the Bengalis have 
Bengal, the Punjabis have Punjab,” a phrase coined by Ghisingh in the 1980s (Ghisingh 
1994, 22). This again is used to stress that the Gorkhas having their own state would avoid 
the confusion between citizens from Nepal and Nepali-speaking Indians. 
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